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Herbert Hoover and the FBI
KENNETH O'REILLY
RECENT REVISIONIST SCHOLARSHIP on Herbert Hoover, often in-
tended to clarify the nature of Hoover's conservatism, has for
the most part emphasized his principled commitment to liberty
and his prophetic warnings about the rise of what would
become known as the military-industrial complex. Con-
spicuously absent from this revisionist scholarship, however, is
any serious assessment of Hoover's relationship with the Federal
Bureau of Investigation (formerly the Bureau of Investigation
and hereafter referred to as the FBI) - a government bureau-
racy that for much of the recent past rarely has been troubled by
legal or constitutional constraints and has evidenced support of
the ideological goals of the so-called national security state. An
analysis of the Hoover-FBI relationship can add to the ongoing
debate over the nature of Hoover's conservatism by qualifying
his recently entrenched reputation as a man driven not by par-
tisanship or expediency but by uncompromising principles.
The revisionist rehabilitation of Hoover, a man system-
atically maligned by liberal historians and others who gave his
Research for this article was made possible by a generous grant from the
Hoover Presidential Library Association.
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name to those wretched places where the victims of the Great
Depression gathered to live, is by now familiar to most students
of twentieth-century America.^ The dour conservative who was
convinced that many Depression-era indigents had quit their
jobs for the more profitable career of selling apples on New
York City street corners has been transformed by some left-of-
center historians into a compassionate, reform-minded pro-
gressive. Dismissing the New Deal liberals' caricature of Hoover
as a president immobilized by a cold-blooded ideology, the pro-
ponents of this new analysis contend that Hoover simply re-
fused to put the United States on the road to fascism. Later, during
the Cold War, Hoover and other principled conservatives op-
posed further extension of state power by challenging the
wisdom of open-ended military spending and global com-
mitments to contain revolutionary change.^
Hoover may have been "subversive of upper class
interests," as William Appleman Williams and other historians
contend. "He 'railed,' "at times,
against the "political bankruptcy" of both major parties; repeat-
edly remarked that "the only trouble with capitalism is capitalists.
They're too damned greedy"; . . . disliked Churchill and
Hitler —as well as Stalin —for all the right reasons; and said blunt-
ly and publicly during World War I that the central evil of "un-
bridled individualism" is "the lack of responsibility in the
American individual to the people as a whole."•'
Williams' additional assertion that Hoover's civil liberties record
1. For critical reviews of the new literature, see Arthur M. Schlesinger,
Jr., "Hoover Makes a Comeback," New York Times Review of Books, 8 March
1979, 10-16; Patrick G. O'Brien and Philip T. Rosen, "Hoover and the
Historians: The Resurrection of a President," The Annals of Iowa 46 (1981),
25-42, 83-99.
2. Hoover, of course, maintained that the New Deal was fascist. See
Herbert Hoover, Memoirs, 3 vols. (New York, 1952), vol. 3, The Great
Depression, 1929-1941, 195, 420-439; Donald J. Mrozek, "Progressive
Dissenter: Herbert Hoover's Opposition to Truman's Overseas Military
Policy," The Annals of Iowa 43 (Spring 1976), 275-291; Justus D. Doenecke,
Not to the Swift: The Old Isolationists in the Cold War Era (Lewisburg, PA,
1979).
3. Quoted in Williams' review of David Burner, Herbert Hoover: A
Public Life, in New Republic, 10 March 1979, 35-36.
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represented yet another example of this subversiveness,
however, cannot be convincingly documented. Instead, the
record of his close relationship with the FBI suggests an indif-
ference to the democratic process all too characteristic of the
men who followed Hoover into the Oval Office. Hoover, in-
deed, used and occasionally abused the FBI's investigative
resources for political purposes. During the early Depression
years. White House aides solicited from the Bureau domestic in-
telligence (non-criminal) reports on groups and individuals who
wrote letters to the president. On other occasions, Hoover's
aides requested investigations of the president's critics. Long
after he left the White House, moreover, the former president
continued to receive briefings and documents from FBI officials
which were used to discredit his (and the Bureau's) critics.
Hoover's assistance to the FBI and its director, J. Edgar
Hoover, began in 1924. At that time, while serving as secretary
of commerce. Hoover recommended to Attorney General
Harlan Fiske Stone that J. Edgar Hoover head the Bureau. And
he made this recommendation — at the suggestion of his per-
sonal secretary, Lawrence Richey, a former Secret Service agent
and "a good friend" of the FBI chief - despite J. Edgar Hoover's
rather dismal civil liberties record. As the inconspicuous head of
the Bureau's antiradical unit during the postwar red scare,
J. Edgar Hoover had supervised the General Intelligence Divi-
sion's sweeping domestic intelligence investigations, including
the compilation of files on some 450,000 Communists,
Socialists, and other dissidents. The Teapot Dome scandals and
attendant congressional investigations that later engulfed the
Justice Department prompted President Coolidge to fire At-
torney General Harry Daugherty and to appoint Stone, a
former dean of the Columbia Law School, as his successor.
Stone, in turn, fired Bureau director William J. Burns. When
Stone named J. Edgar Hoover as his new "reform" director of the
thoroughly politicized Bureau, he specifically charged him to
weed out the political hacks and to confine investigations to
violations of federal statutes.*
4. For the General Intelligence Division surveillance, see U.S. Congress,
Senate, Select Committee to Study Governmental Operations with Respect to
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Later, during Hoover's presidency, the Bureau began to ser-
vice occasional requests for political information. If the FBI
director did not provide these services in every case in response
to direct requests (or orders) from the president, the existing
documentary record indicates that at least three of Hoover's
closest aides - Richey, White House secretary Walter H.
Newton, and press secretary Theodore Joslin —routinely
solicited Bureau assistance. This reliance on senior presidential
aides was common to most of Hoover's successors, with the
notable exception of Lyndon B. Johnson. During the Johnson
years. White House aide Marvin Watson advised the FBI that all
sensitive domestic intelligence reports should be addressed to a
lower-level White House staff member. This staff member,
Watson "and the President" reasoned, "did not have the direct
connection with the President that he [Watson] had and, conse-
quently, people who saw such communications would not
suspicion that Watson or the President had requested such in-
formation or were instructed in such information."^ Whether or
not a similar conscious effort was made to insulate the president
during the years Hoover occupied the Oval Office, it would be
naive to conclude that Hoover's aides simply acted independent-
ly out of a misguided sense of personal loyalty when soliciting
political intelligence from the Bureau.
Intelligence Activities, "Final Report," in Supplementary Reports on In-
telligence Activities (Book 6), 94th Cong., 2d sess., 1976, 98-101, 114. For
Hoover's recommendation to Stone, see Hoover, Memoirs, vol. 2, The
Cabinet and the Presidency, 1920-1933, 55, 273; Don Whitehead, The FBI
Story (1956; reprint ed.. New York, 1963), 77. Based on privileged access to
Bureau files, Whitehead's quasi-official history remains a valuable source of
information on the FBI. Richey, for his part, emerged as a White House
"plumber" of sorts. He investigated press leaks, maintained an informal
blacklist of President Hoover's critics, and was rumored to have directed an
organization active in assembling derogatory information on the personal and
official lives of Democratic officials. See Craig Lloyd, Aggressive Introvert: A
Study of Herbert Hoover and Public Relations Management, 1912-1932 (Col-
umbus, OH, 1972), 180n; Memo, 2 May 1933, Louis Nichols Unserialized Of-
ficial and Confidential FBI Files —Val O'Farrell (copies available in the Mar-
quette University Library, Milwaukee, WI).
5. Quoted in Athan Theoharis, Spying on Americans: Political
Surveillance from Hoover to the Huston Plan (Philadelphia, 1978), 179.
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FBI assistance to the Hoover White House began in
November 1929 when the president received a letter from Alex-
ander Lincoln, a Boston attorney, registered Republican, and
head of the Sentinels of the Republic. A national organization
founded during the postwar red scare and composed largely of
wealthy patriots, the Sentinels were dedicated to opposing the
spread of radicalism and the increasing centralization of power
in the federal government. Lincoln and other members of the
Sentinels' executive committee were troubled by Hoover's recent
"appointment of a so-called Child Health Commission, sup-
ported by private funds from an undisclosed source" and man-
dated "to investigate matters outside of the jurisdiction of the
Federal Government." Whether or not at President Hoover's
direct order, Richey responded to Lincoln's letter by requesting
an FBI check. Two agents of the Bureau's Washington, D.C,
field office were then assigned to the "investigation." They un-
covered no information beyond a few names and addresses and
were forced to rely for the most part on the Sentinels' own
published literature — obtained when one Bureau agent "visited"
Sentinel offices "under a suitable pretext." The affair concluded
on November 29 with J. Edgar Hoover's report to Richey.*
At best, the FBI probe of the Sentinels of the Republic was a
crude if relatively unintrusive intelligence operation. At worst,
the investigation raised the issue of the Bureau's subservience to
the White House. J. Edgar Hoover rarely distinguished between
legitimate national security or law enforcement infonnation and
purely political intelligence.^ Instead, when submitting the
6. Lincoln to Herbert Hoover, 16 November 1929, Subject file — Sentinels
of the Republic, Herbert Hoover Papers, Herbert Hoover Presidential Library,
West Branch, Iowa (hereafter cited as HHP); R. E. Vetterli to J. Edgar Hoover,
21 November 1929, ibid.; J. Edgar Hoover to Richey, 21 November 1929, ibid.
The Sentinels were subjected to a more systematic investigation during 1935
and 1936 by the Senate Committee to Investigate Lobbying Activities, the so-
called Black Committee.
7. A notable exception involved a poem, published in the Socialist
Milwaukee Leader, which was brought to Richey's attention by Hinton G.
Clabaugh. A government prosecutor during the 1918 sedition trial of Bill
Haywood and other Industrial Workers of the World leaders, Clabaugh of-
fered the poem as evidene that the president's critics and other dissidents had
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report on the Sentinels to Richey, he made an open-ended offer
of assistance: "If there is anything further you want me to do in
connection with this matter, and will advise me, I will give it im-
mediate attention."» The Hoover White House never again
solicited information on the Sentinels of the Republic but did re-
quest reports on other groups and individuals. Richey re-
ceived two additional FBI reports the next month on the Foreign
Policy Association and the American Civil Liberties Union. In
contrast to the Sentinels, these groups were critical of the
Hoover administration from a liberal perspective. In the spring
of 1930 two more White House requests for political in-
telligence, on the National Association for the Advancement of
Colored People and the Federation of Lictor, were channeled
through the Justice Department. The report on the Federation of
Lictor, which the Bureau suspected of being a front for Italian
fascism, was inspired by a telegram sent by the organization to
the White House in general support of the president's policies.
The next year, Richey forwarded yet another request to At-
torney General William D. Mitchell for a probe of the Moorish
Science Temple of America. The president and apparently only
member of this alleged organization, a barber from Reading,
Pennsylvania, had invited President Hoover to attend a conven-
tion of the Moorish Science Temple in Chicago.'
"overstepped the line." He specifically recommended prosecuting "in the same
way that it was done in 1918, . . . the leaders of the radical element." Richey
responded by forwarding Clabaugh's letter to J. Edgar Hoover. The FBI direc-
tor advised the White House a week later that "no existing Federal Statute
could be held to apply to matters of this kind." Clabaugh to Richey, 13 July
1932, Subject file-Poetry, HHP; J. Edgar Hoover to Richey, 20 July 1932,
ibid.
8. J. Edgar Hoover to Richey, 21 November 1929, Subject file - Sentinels
of the Republic, HHP.
9. J. Edgar Hoover to Richey, 11 December 1929, Subject file - American
Civil Liberties Union, HHP; Memo, J. Edgar Hoover to Assistant Attorney
General Sisson, 19 April 1930, Subject file-Colored Question, HHP;
Telegram, Federazione del Littorial (Federation of Lictor] to Herbert Hoover,
18 May 1930, Foreign affairs file — Countries (Italy, Correspondence), HHP;
Memo, J. Edgar Hoover to Assistant Attorney General Carusi, 23 May 1930,
ibid.; J. G. Bey to Herbert Hoover, n. d.. President's secretary's
file-Moorhead-Moos, HHP; Richey to Mitchell, 10 September 1931, ibid.;
Memo, J. Edgar Hoover to attorney general, 12 September 1931, ibid.
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Less frequently, J. Edgar Hoover volunteered information
to the Hoover White House which suggested the subversive and
violent nature of the American Communist party. These reports
included an allegation of a bizarre plot to blow up the Capitol
made by an informant of the Colorado Springs, Colorado,
police department. This informant, a former bus company
employee who "had the opportunity to travel very extensively,"
identified such "hot bed[s] of radicalism" as "the water front near
the lower end of Manhattan," "two [St. Louis] hotels at the cor-
ner of 6th and Chestnut Streets," and "a small park near the
Mexican section of Los Angeles, where agitators are allowed to
talk to their hearts [sic] content."i"
On other occasions, presidential aides requested the Bureau
to investigate specific groups and individuals after receiving in-
quiries from third parties. One FBI report, based on "a very
discreet investigation" of the obscure American Citizens
Political Awakening Association, was forwarded in part by
presidential secretary Walter Newton to the Minneapolis Civic
and Commerce Association. The Bureau's role in compiling the
report, of course, was not disclosed. Newton attributed the in-
formation to "a reliable source." A few weeks later, on February
26, 1930, J. Edgar Hoover advised Newton that the Bureau had
in its possession a number of cancelled checks endorsed by an
official of the Political Awakening Association. "These checks,"
the FBI director concluded, "in all probability, were in payment
of dues or membership
C-/N SEVERAL OCCASIONS Bureau aid went beyond sporadic
background checks or preliminary investigations. In October
1931, press secretary Theodore Joslin received a letter from
Joseph R. Nutt, chairman of the board of the Union Trust Com-
10. J. Edgar Hoover to Richey, 26 August 1932, Subject file-FBI, HHP;
H. D. Harper to J. Edgar Hoover, 20 August 1932, ibid.
11. F. J. Mann to Minneapolis Chamber of Commerce, 4 February 1930,
Foreign affairs file — Countries (Italy, Correspondence), HHP; P. S. Williams
to Newton, 11 February 1930, ibid.; Newton to J. Edgar Hoover, 15 February
1930, ibid.; J. Edgar Hoover to Newton, 18 February 1930, ibid.; J. Edgar
Hoover to Newton, 26 February 1930, Subject file —American Citizens
Political Awakening Association, HHP; Newton to Williams, 20 February
1939, ibid.
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pany and treasurer of the Republican National Committee. Nutt
had written to complain about a newsletter being distributed by
George Menhinick of Syracuse, New York. Based in large part
on information culled from the Wall Street Journal, Menhinick's
newsletter, aptly entitled Wall Street Forecast, emphasized the
dismal situation facing American bankers. Given the bleak
economic situation, such reporting was to be expected. And the
purpose of Menhinick's newsletter — to report on the general
condition of banks, stocks, etc., for investment purposes-was
routine. Nevertheless, Nutt described the Wall Street Forecast
as "the most vicious thing that has yet come to my notice." He
specifically requested that Menhinick be "reached." There is no
evidence that Joslin, or the president, recommended a specific
course of action. Whether acting unilaterally or at the direct
order of Attorney General Mitchell, the FBI director "reached"
Menhinick by dispatching five agents to Syracuse. "It is obvious
from his present attitude," one agent later reported, "that
[Menhinick] is thoroughly scared and I do not believe he will
resume the dissemination of any information concerning the
banks or other financial institutions." The attorney general then
forwarded the Bureau report to the White House and Joslin, in
turn, sent it to Nutt.^^
The Menhinick affair was typical of the FBI's assistance to
the Hoover White House. A more serious —if ultimately
understandable - abuse of FBI investigative resources occurred
when the Navy League of the United States publicly challenged
the president's defense policies. Founded in 1903 as a civilian
society (Navy regulations barred officers from engaging in any
type of propaganda activity), the Navy League had a dual mis-
sion: On the one hand. Navy League activists worked to
educate Americans on the connection between sea power and
their nation's new international responsibilities. On the other
hand, they actively lobbied for increased naval expenditures.
Navy League membership consisted of a predictable mixture of
super-patriots, former Navy officers, the rank and file of the
12. Nutt to Joslin, 6 October 1931, President's secretary's file —Menh-
Menl, HHP; Memo, ]. Edgar Hoover to attorney general, 10 October 1931,
ibid.; Joslin to Nutt, 13 October 1931, ibid.
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New York Naval Militia, other state and local civilian organiza-
tions, and businessmen from the ship building, munitions, and
armor plate industries."
President Hoover's confrontation with the Navy League
began in late August 1929 when he was preparing for a naval
arms limitation conference to be held the next year in London.
Concerned about the strength of the "big Navy lobby" and its
vocal opposition to the London conference. Hoover sought to
discredit the League and thus generate public support for his
arms limitation initiatives. An opportunity arose when the press
began reporting the activities of a former Navy League lobbyist,
William B. Shearer. An unsavory character on whom Scotland
Yard and the Sûreté' General maintained active dossiers. Shearer
had attended the earlier Geneva naval conference of 1927 in the
employ of the big three United States ship builders — Bethlehem
Shipbuilding Company, Newport News Shipbuilding and Dry
Dock Company, and American Brown Boveri Electric Corpora-
tion. In Geneva, Shearer entertained lavishly, spread rumors,
and reportedly attempted to bribe congressmen. Later, he sued
the big three for failing to pay his expenses and fees for services
rendered. After the press began publicizing the Shearer affair in
late August 1929, Hoover directed the FBI to make a discreet in-
quiry and publicly called for a congressional investigation.^*
As Hoover wrote to Secretary of State Henry L. Stimson,
he expected the Shearer affair to serve as "a useful public exam-
ple."^^ The affair, indeed, seemed to justify the charge that
pacifist congressmen and other had been raising for nearly two
decades: that the Navy League membership and directorship
had a financial stake in naval construction. The big Navy lob-
by, however, refused to wither away. When a second public
confrontation erupted between the League (sans Shearer) and
the president in the fall of 1931, Hoover again — in the approv-
13. For a general history of the League see Armin Rappaport, The Navy
League of the United States (Detroit, 1962).
14. For Shearer, see John E. Wiltz, In Search of Peace: The Senate Muni-
tions Inquiry, 1934-1936 (Baton Rouge, 1963), 8-9.
15. Quoted in David Burner, Herbert Hoover: A Public Life (New York,
1979), 291.
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ing words of Senator Arthur Capper —"went after this outfit."^*
President Hoover might have had a legitimate reason for
concem during the Shearer controversy. The issue in 1931, in
contrast, was more political. In September Hoover had pro-
posed drastic cuts in the naval building program and its complete
elimination by 1933. Such frugality would help balance the
budget and provide a relatively safe gesture on behalf of world
peace. In contrast to the president. Navy League activists, as
always, saw war on the horizon. In response to Hoover's deci-
sion, then. Navy League president William H. Gardiner charged
that a secret deal had been struck with the British prime minister,
Ramsay MacDonald, prior to the London conference of 1930. To
support this charge, Gardiner noted Hoover's refusal "to allow
even an executive session of the Senate Foreign Relations Com-
mittee to see the full record of its (the administration's] negotia-
tions preparatory to the . . . conference." Gardiner's indict-
ment, published by the Navy League as a sixteen-page brochure
entitled The President and the Navy and distributed to the press,
select congressmen, and senior Navy officers, also accused
Hoover of "abysmal ignorance." The booklet stopped just short
of raising the specter of treason.^^
The White House responded by directing the FBI to in-
vestigate the president's critics. On at least five occasions in late
October and early November 1931, FBI director Hoover for-
warded biographical data and other information on Navy
League activists to presidential secretary Richey. The White
House learned, for instance, that Ogden Mills Reid, Henry
Cabot Lodge, Jr., and other notable Americans "contribute to
the League to an extent beyond that due from its regular and
contributing members." The FBI's investigative techniques in-
cluded "pretext" interviews with select officers of the League, in-
cluding Gardiner. All were "confidentially approached" in such
a manner that they were never "cognizant of the Bureau's in-
terest." These bogus interviews, nevertheless, failed to establish
the numerical membership of the League. The FBI director
16. Capper to Richey, 3 November 1931, Subject file — Navy League of
the U.S. Investigation, HHP.
17. Rappaport, Navy League, 142, 144.
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responded to this initial failure by advising Richey that such "in-
formation is possessed by only a few persons and seems ex-
tremely difficult to obtain confidentially." Relying instead on
another investigative technique. Bureau agents in New York
City surmounted this problem by securing "confidential access"
to an internal Navy League financial report listing the total
number of dues-paying members. (Bureau agents may have ob-
tained this League report through a mail intercept or a break in;
the FBI routinely disguised illegal investigative techniques by
blandly referring to "highly confidential sources," "anonymous
sources," and similar terms.) Other FBI agents searched "the
records of the Bureau of Internal Revenue . . . as far back as
1923 . . . [and] covering all of the districts of the United
States," in a fruitless attempt to provide the Hoover White
House with information it could use to discredit the League."
One day after receiving the last of the FBI's reports, the
president appointed a special committee to probe Gardiner's
charges. Hoover named to this special committee Admiral Hugh
Rodman and three personal friends, mining engineer John Hays
Hammond, former Assistant Secretary of the Treasury Eliot
Wadsworth, and Undersecretary of State William R. Castle.
Although Hammond and Wadsworth were also members of the
Navy League, the committee's report of November 6 highlighted
the inaccuracies and distortions contained in Gardiner's original
indictment. Significantly, the special committee did not probe
the Navy League's membership, principally because the FBI had
failed to uncover any startling information. Extensive press
coverage of the Hoover-Navy League controversy, including
coverage of the special committee's report, was for the most
part critical of the League for insulting the president. The Navy
League also suffered internal divisions over the wisdom of Gar-
diner's confrontational politics.i'
18. J. Edgar Hoover to Richey (five letters), 30 October 1931, 30 October
1931, 30 October 1931, 31 October 1931, 2 November 1931, Subject
file —Navy League of the U.S. Investigation, HHP.
19. For a sampling of press coverage of the controversy, see "Hits and
Duds in the Hoover-Navy League Fight," Literary Digest, 14 November 1931,
8-10.
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On at least two other occasions, the Hoover administration
either initiated or supported FBI investigations that rivaled the
scope of the Navy League probe and its reliance on intrusive, if
unspecified, investigative techniques. The farmers' strikes of
1932, for instance, were the subject of intensive FBI surveillance
with J. Edgar Hoover submitting to the White House a number
of reports and agents in the field sending at least twenty-four
telegrams to Bureau headquarters.^° The best known case,
however, involved the "hunger marches" of the Depression era
and in particular FBI efforts to document Communist influence
among the so-called Bonus Expeditionary Force.
BEGINNING IN MAY 1930, Bureau informers began infiltrating
the ranks of at least one Communist party-sponsored veterans
organization. Later, in the late spring of 1932, when these and
thousands of other World War I veterans began to arrive in
Washington seeking congressional approval for early payment
of a soldiers' bonus, the FBI escalated its surveillance. Ignoring
the reports of his own agents, J. Edgar Hoover insisted that the
protest was part of a Communist plot to topple the government.
Agreeing with the FBI director, who assured him that the pro-
testers were influenced by a Communist cadre. Army Chief of
Staff General Douglas MacArthur prepared for war. He called
up reserves, tanks, and artillery and proceeded to rout the pro-
testing veterans at bayonet point from abandoned federal
buildings and the Anacostia mud flats, where the government
had earlier given the veterans permission to camp. Ironically,
the handful of Communist organizers participating in the pro-
test were meeting in a church in another part of the city at the
time of MacArthur's raid. MacArthur, moreover, ignored Presi-
dent Hoover's direct order to stop at the Anacostia River
Bridge. Rather than disciplining the insubordinate general,
however, the president publicly supported his actions in the in-
terest of executive branch unity. Hoover instead denounced the
veterans as ex-criminals and Communists, basing his contention
on the reports of J. Edgar Hoover and the FBI's cursory in-
vestigation of some two thousand bonus marchers. Despite the
20. See Cabinet Offices file-Justice Department (Farmers' Strike), HHP.
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Bureau's assistance. Hoover failed to document his charges and
the Bonus affair emerged during the subsequent campaign as a
serious liability for the president.^^
Hoover continued to support and to receive favors from
the FBI after his defeat in the 1932 presidential election. Once, in
1933, when it was widely rumored that President-elect
Roosevelt would fire the FBI director. Hoover lobbied for
J. Edgar Hoover and even put in a good word for his friend
when riding with Franklin Roosevelt from the inaugural
ceremonies.22 With Roosevelt in the White House, however.
Hoover found himself on the other side of the fence: The FBI oc-
casionally reported to the Roosevelt administration on the
former president's political activities. In July 1940, Roosevelt
specifically directed the Bureau to investigate Hoover and
Richey after receiving a tip from newspaper columnist Marquis
Childs. Childs told Roosevelt that Hoover and Richey, when at-
tending the recent Republican National Convention, had sent
cablegrams to Vichy France. These communications, Childs sur-
mised, were intended to elicit a statement from Pierre Laval, the
former French premier and at that time a Nazi collaborator, in-
dicating that Roosevelt had already made "definite com-
mitments" to send United States soldiers abroad. Assistant
Secretary of State Adolf A. Berle, Jr., in turn, relayed President
Roosevelt's request for an investigation to Edward A. Tamm, an
FBI assistant director. The president wanted to know the exact
contents of the Hoover-Richey cablegrams. Bureau agents
responded by checking with every trans-Atlantic communica-
tion company in New York City, but failed to locate any record
of the alleged cablegrams.^^
Thereafter, Hoover may have been kept under sorne type
of surveillance. In February 1941, the FBI director sent a report
to the White House detailing the former president's luncheon
21. David Williams, "Failed Reform: FBI Political Surveillance,
1924-1936," First Principles, September/October 1981, 3; Hoover, Great
Depression, 226. See also Donald J. Lisio, The President and Protest: Hoover,
Conspiracy, and the Bonus Riot (Columbia, MO, 1974).
22. Whitehead, FBI Story, 107.
23. Memos, Tamm to ]. Edgar Hoover, 2 July 1940, 10 July 1940, Herbert
Hoover file, Nichols Official and Confidential FBI Files.
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conversation with the British ambassador. Lord Halifax, re-
garding Winston Churchill's opposition to Hoover's proposed
plan to ship food and other supplies to unoccupied areas of
France.^ ^ The full extent of the FBI's surveillance of Hoover and
concomitant dissemination to the White House of information
detailing his activities is not known. J. Edgar Hoover and other
FBI officials were clearly willing to ingratiate themselves with
any incumbent president. These FBI officials nonetheless often
acted according to their own political priorities — regardless of
whoever happened to occupy the White House — and thus con-
tinued to cooperate with the conservative Herbert Hoover.
When responding to a specific request from Hoover in Feb-
ruary 1946, for example, J. Edgar Hoover sent the former presi-
dent "blind" memoranda (without identifying FBI letterhead)
outlining the alleged Communist party connections of Michael
Sayers and Albert E. Kahn. Sayers and Kahn had recently pub-
lished what Hoover considered to be a "new defamation book."^^
A few months later, the FBI director advised Hoover that he had
come across "some more information concerning the
biography which is being prepared about you." Apparently,
J. Edgar Hoover had already briefed the former president on
this subject. And in 1957 Hoover received a classified FBI
monograph entitled "Communism Versus the Jewish People."^*
24. J. Edgar Hoover to Edwin Watson, 8 February 1941, #634, Official
File 10-B, Franklin D. Roosevelt Presidential Library, Hyde Park, New York.
Churchill was also the subject of an FBI report: The Bureau informed the
Roosevelt White House on the prime minister's drinking habits. Memo, 29
March 1943, FBI Reports (Misc. 1943), Harry Hopkins Papers, Roosevelt
Library. Roosevelt, who suspected Hoover of supplying Axis propagandists
with material, also ordered Federal Communications Commission chairman
James Fly in September 1941 to prepare a report on the former president. Hav-
ing failed to document Roosevelt's suspicions. Fly nonetheless promised to
keep trying. Richard W. Steele, "Franklin D. Roosevelt and His Foreign Policy
Critics," Political Science Quarterly 94 (Spring 1979), 23.
25. Herbert Hoover to J. Edgar Hoover, 7 February 1946, Post-
presidential papers —Individual, HHP; J. Edgar Hoover to Herbert Hoover, 15
February 1946, ibid.; Michael Sayers and Albert E. Kahn, The Great Con-
spiracy: The Secret War Against Soviet Russia (Boston, 1946).
26. J. Edgar Hoover to Herbert Hoover, 25 July 1946, 20 February 1957,
Post-presidential papers — Individual, HHP.
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When forwarding such information from Bureau files to
the former president, J. Edgar Hoover was not simply providing
a service for an old friend. He fully expected Hoover, still a for-
midable public spokesman, to publicize the information re-
ceived, particularly if it could be used to document the subver-
siveness of American Communists and other dissidents. Perhaps
the most explicit example of this involved FBI officials' suc-
cessful efforts to enlist Hoover in their campaign to "neutralize"
the Fund for the Republic. A non-profit educational corporation
established by the Ford Foundation in 1952, the Fund was head-
ed by such noted liberals as Paul G. Hoffman, Chester Bowles,
Erwin N. Griswold, and W. H. Ferry. The organization's
priorities included distributing books, pamphlets, and films and
awarding outright grants to individuals and organizations com-
mitted to fighting racism and McCarthyism.^^ The Fund became
a priority "target" of an informal FBI counterintelligence opera-
tion in 1955 when it hired liberal Catholic activist John Cogley,
of the Catholic Worker movement and Commonweal, to write
a report on entertainment industry blacklisting. Of even greater
interest to senior Bureau officials was the Fund's recent award of
a $25,000 grant to the Stanford Law School to study the
testimony of four ex-Communist government witnesses — FBI
informers Elizabeth Bentley, Whittaker Chambers, John
Lautner, and Louis F. Budenz.
The FBI's allies responded quickly. The House Committee
on Un-American Activities launched a preliminary staff in-
vestigation while Fulton Lewis, Jr., began a series of radio
broadcasts demanding an Internal Revenue Service audit of the
Fund's tax exempt status. Both the House Committee and Lewis
were frequent recipients of derogatory political and personal in-
formation leaked from the Bureau's "confidential" files. Other
media confreres with access to the FBI archives joined the
assault including George Sokolsky, Westbrook Pegler, David
Lawrence, Walter Trohan, Paul Harvey, and „Frederick
Woltman. As part of this drive to discredit the Fund for the
Republic, FBI director Hoover sent Herbert Hoover, then a
27. For the Fund, see Frank K. Kelly, Court of Reason: Robert Hutchins
and the Fund for the Republic (New York, 1981).
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Stanford University trustee, a seventeen-page blind memoran-
dum itemizing the alleged subversiveness of the Fund's officers.
This leak to Hoover was part of a careful strategy generated
only after one of the FBI director's top aides met with Lawrence
ey.
Bureau objectives, moreover, were quite clear. The Stan-
ford Law School had accepted the award from the Fund without
consulting university trustees. By supplying Hoover with
derogatory information on Fund officials, the FBI hoped that
the former president could convince his fellow trustees to
disassociate Stanford from this particular Fund project.
Georgetown University and a number of other eastern univer-
sities, after all, had rejected the project before Stanford Law
School finally accepted it. Hoover did convince the trustees to
"examine" the award and an investigation was launched into the
circumstances surrounding its acceptance. The trustees,
however, apparently overruled Hoover. The grant from the
Fund was not returned and the project was eventually com-
pleted, in 1962, under the direction of Stanford law professor
Herbert L. Packer." By that time, the Fund had changed its
name to the Center for the Study of Democratic Institutions and
was no longer a politically adventuresome foundation.
The symbiotic relationship between the former president
and the FBI director can explain in part Hoover's willingness to
enlist in the Bureau campaign to discredit the Fund for the
Republic. Of perhaps more importance was Hoover's more than
passing interest in the credibility of the FBI's informers. He had
become increasingly defensive, for instance, about his own role
in the bonus riot of 1932. This controversy surfaced again in the
early 1950s after Harry S. Truman fired General MacArthur for
insubordination. When attempting to document his assertion
that the bonus army was led by Communists, Hoover relied
almost exclusively on the recent revelations of FBI informers
28. J. Edgar Hoover to Herbert Hoover, 8 September 1955, Post-
presidential papers-Individual, HHP; Memo, Re: Fund for the Republic, 6
September 1955, ibid.
29. Herbert L. Packer, Ex-Communist Witnesses: Four Studies in Fact
Finding (Stanford, 1962).
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Benjamin Gitlow and John T. Pace. J. Edgar Hoover, of course,
shared this concern. In 1951, when the former president was
completing his memoirs, the Bureau director sent Hoover a
copy of Pace's recently-released executive session testimony
before the House Committee on Un-American Activities. "This
testimony," the FBI director advised, ". . . certainly would
justify your action during those hectic days. "^^
Despite his willingness at times to embrace FBI informers'
vision of a world under siege and his role in a number of ques-
tionable FBI domestic intelligence investigations, ranging from
the probe of the Sentinels of the Republic in 1929 to the effort to
discredit the Fund for the Republic in 1955, Hoover's civil liber-
ties record remains ambivalent. As president, his use and abuse
of the FBI was circumspect — especially when compared with the
more systematic exploitation of the Bureau's domestic in-
telligence activities by Presidents Roosevelt, Truman,
Eisenhower, Kennedy, Johnson, and Nixon. If Hoover respond-
ed to the pressures of the Great Depression by ordering FBI in-
vestigations of lawful political activity, he never considered in-
stitutionalizing the Bureau's federal surveillance role. Had his
abuse of the FBI been publicized by contemporaries, probably
no grand claims of "inherent executive authority" would have
emanated from Hoover's Oval Office. And although the FBI
began to assume some additional duties during Hoover's
presidency, including the gathering of uniform crime statistics
and the compilation of a national fingerprint file. Hoover re-
mained a "states' righter" on the crime issue and saw no need to
create an internal security Cerberus. When Hoover left the
White House the FBI remained a relatively obscure division
within the Department of Justice employing 266 special agents
and 60 accountants. Under the Democratic administrations of
Roosevelt and Truman, in contrast, the Bureau's annual budget
increased from a modest $3 million to over $70 million.^ ^
During the Cold War, moreover. Hoover never consistent-
ly embraced the messianic anti-Communism favored by those
30. J. Edgar Hoover to Herbert Hoover, 16 July 1951, Post-presidential
papers — Individual, HHP; Hoover, Great Depression, 230-232.
31. Whitehead, FBI Story, 107.
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who held that the United States Constitution should not be
allowed to hinder the search for subversives. While Hoover
then doubted whether "there are any consequential card-
carrying communists in the Government," he nonetheless
believed "that there are men in Government (not Communists)
whose attitudes are such that they have disastrously advised on
policies in relation to Communist Russia." For this reason alone,
he supported, during the McCarthy era, "a wide spread [con-
gressional] inquiry into the past and present of such men."^ ^
Hoover was certainly opposed to intrusive government in-
tervention in the economy or in the private lives of American
citizens —or at least those Americans who could think straight
"in relation to Communist Russia." Similarly, he warned the na-
tion, in 1934, about the dangers of government bureaucracies
and their tireless efforts to exploit "the radio, the platform, and
the press" in order to propagate "one point of view," transform
"the nation's mentality," and destroy "its independent
judgment."^'' But this warning did not stop Hoover from
cooperating with the FBI or enlisting in at least one Bureau cam-
paign, against the Fund for the Republic, designed to mobilize
"the radio, the platform, and the press."
Hoover's sensitivity to the fragility of civil liberties, in
short, was sometimes compromised by expendiency, partisan-
ship, and a belief that radical demands for social change or even
the policies advocated by rival Democrats were somehow
subversive. Clearly, at least in the realm of civil liberties,
Herbert Hoover hardly deserves his reputation as a principled
conservative unwilling to compromise his commitment to liber-
ty and constitutional freedoms.
32. Hoover to Truman, 26 November 1950, Official file 2750-A, Harry S.
Truman Presidential Library; Independence, Missouri.
33. Herbert Hoover, The Challenge to Liberty (New York, 1934),
135-136.
63

